Where the tier lives#
Every pool fixes its risk multiplier once, at InitPool, as risk_mult_bps in itsProductTerms. Each Buy from that pool is priced with the same multiplier, and the validator's premium floor uses it, so a buyer cannot choose a cheaper tier for the same risk. Both live Preview pools (USDM depeg and the exploit-cover v2 committee pool) are tier B, 10_000 bps. The openunderwriting book shows the concrete scorecard answers and capital for each live pool. The tier picker on /cover is there to compare prices across pools.
Score a protocol#
Answer the questions for the protocol or stablecoin you want covered. The result comes from the samescoreRiskTier function the SDK tests check, so it is exactly what an underwriter would set.
Answer every question to see the tier (0 of 6 answered).
Exploit cover rubric#
| Criterion | Answers and points | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Independent audits of the deployed contracts | None: declines · One audit: 2 · Two or more audits: 3 | An audit is the minimum evidence that someone outside the team read the code that holds the funds. |
| Time live on mainnet with user funds | Under 3 months: 0, caps at C · 3–12 months: 1 · 12–24 months: 2 · Over 24 months: 3 | Code that has held real value for longer has survived more attack attempts. |
| Who can change the contracts | Single admin key, no timelock: 0, caps at C · Multisig or timelocked upgrades: 2 · Immutable scripts: 3 | An upgrade key is a second way to lose funds: a stolen or misused key can replace the code. |
| Public bug bounty | None: 0 · Public, funded bounty: 2 | A funded bounty gives whitehats a reason to report instead of exploit. |
| Past exploits or losses | A loss that is not yet fixed or repaid: declines · A past loss, fixed and repaid: 1 · No known losses: 2 | An unresolved loss means the root cause may still be live. |
| Price oracle dependence | Depends on one price source: 0, caps at B · Multi-source or TWAP oracle: 1 · No oracle dependence: 2 | A protocol that trusts one price source can be drained by manipulating it. |
Maximum 15 points.
Depeg cover rubric#
| Criterion | Answers and points | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| What backs the stablecoin | Algorithmic or unbacked: declines · Over-collateralized on-chain: 2 · Fiat reserves with published attestations: 3 | Algorithmic designs can enter a death spiral that no reserve stops. |
| Redemption at par | No redemption: 0, caps at C · Permissioned (KYC) redemption: 1 · Permissionless redemption: 2 | If holders can redeem at 1.00, arbitrage pulls the price back toward the peg. |
| Independent price venues with real depth | Fewer than three: declines · Three: 1 · Four or more: 2 | The depeg oracle takes a quorum of independent venues; with fewer than three it cannot settle a claim. |
| Time since launch | Under 6 months: 0, caps at C · 6–24 months: 1 · Over 24 months: 2 | A longer history shows how the peg behaves under stress. |
| Past breaks below the 0.95 trigger | Broke and has not recovered: declines · Broke, then recovered: 1 · Never below 0.95: 2 | A peg that broke and never recovered is not insurable at any price. |
Maximum 11 points. The three-venue rule mirrors the live depeg oracle, which takes a quorum of three independent Preview feeds before a claim can settle (see /oracle).
Thresholds and caps#
| Tier | Share of max points | Risk multiplier | risk_mult_bps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier A | 80% or more | 0.8× | 8,000 |
| Tier B | 55% or more | 1.0× | 10,000 |
| Tier C | 30% or more | 1.5× | 15,000 |
| Declined | Under 30%, or any hard stop | — | No pool |
Hard stops decline cover however well the rest scores: no audit, an unresolved past loss, an algorithmic or unbacked stablecoin, a peg that broke and never recovered, or fewer than three price venues. Caps limit the best reachable tier: a single admin key with no timelock, under three months live, a stablecoin under six months old or without redemption cap at C, and a single price source caps at B. A cap never improves a tier the points already put lower.