{
  "schema": "plutusshield.open-data/v1",
  "dataset": "book",
  "generatedAt": "2026-10-18T19:59:15.308Z",
  "networks": {
    "cardano": "preview",
    "midnight": "preprod"
  },
  "testnetOnly": true,
  "audited": false,
  "source": "https://github.com/Kshot3000/PlutusShield",
  "page": "https://kshot3000.github.io/PlutusShield/book/",
  "data": {
    "stats": {
      "livePools": 2,
      "legacyPools": 1,
      "tier": "B",
      "riskMultBps": 10000
    },
    "pools": [
      {
        "id": "usdm-depeg",
        "live": true,
        "product": "depeg",
        "title": "USDM depeg pool",
        "subtitle": "Parametric stablecoin depeg cover · multi-oracle TWAP below 0.95 for 24h",
        "network": "Cardano Preview",
        "riskTier": "B",
        "riskMultBps": 10000,
        "baseRateBps": 200,
        "scorecard": {
          "product": "depeg",
          "label": "USDM depeg cover",
          "whyTier": "Over-collateralized on-chain backing with permissionless redemption and three independent oracle venues, a short but clean peg history, and no hard stop — middling points that clear the B band without reaching A.",
          "answers": {
            "backing": "overcollateralized",
            "redemption": "permissionless",
            "venues": "3",
            "age": "6-24m",
            "peg-history": "never"
          }
        },
        "breakdown": [
          {
            "id": "backing",
            "label": "What backs the stablecoin",
            "answer": "Over-collateralized on-chain",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "Algorithmic designs can enter a death spiral that no reserve stops."
          },
          {
            "id": "redemption",
            "label": "Redemption at par",
            "answer": "Permissionless redemption",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "If holders can redeem at 1.00, arbitrage pulls the price back toward the peg."
          },
          {
            "id": "venues",
            "label": "Independent price venues with real depth",
            "answer": "Three",
            "points": 1,
            "why": "The depeg oracle takes a quorum of independent venues; with fewer than three it cannot settle a claim."
          },
          {
            "id": "age",
            "label": "Time since launch",
            "answer": "6–24 months",
            "points": 1,
            "why": "A longer history shows how the peg behaves under stress."
          },
          {
            "id": "peg-history",
            "label": "Past breaks below the 0.95 trigger",
            "answer": "Never below 0.95",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "A peg that broke and never recovered is not insurable at any price."
          }
        ],
        "scored": {
          "points": 8,
          "maxPoints": 11,
          "share": 0.7272727272727273,
          "uncappedTier": "B"
        },
        "whyTier": "Over-collateralized on-chain backing with permissionless redemption and three independent oracle venues, a short but clean peg history, and no hard stop — middling points that clear the B band without reaching A.",
        "address": "addr_test1wp89ggl7ls5gwxh02w7ja6zhytqe4a6zu6m6n82s0cxw9tq4j5tgr",
        "scriptHash": "4e5423fefc28871aef53bd2ee85722c19af742e6b7a99d507e0ce2ac",
        "initTx": "fc2a3ca252051a41589f58b612e08427b512a2cf17e0b3fa5a53500f162ca236",
        "keyTxs": [
          {
            "label": "InitPool",
            "hash": "fc2a3ca252051a41589f58b612e08427b512a2cf17e0b3fa5a53500f162ca236"
          }
        ],
        "tranches": [
          {
            "index": 0,
            "symbol": "ADA",
            "ticker": "tADA",
            "decimals": 6,
            "capital": "2080952000",
            "activeCover": "415000000",
            "freeCapacity": "1457856800",
            "utilizationBps": 1994,
            "totalShares": "2042780875"
          },
          {
            "index": 1,
            "symbol": "USDC",
            "ticker": "tUSDCx",
            "decimals": 6,
            "capital": "100039963287",
            "activeCover": "7025000000",
            "freeCapacity": "83010966958",
            "utilizationBps": 702,
            "totalShares": "100000000000"
          }
        ],
        "policyCount": 11,
        "snapshotTakenAt": "2026-10-18T19:58:31.500Z",
        "maxUtilizationBps": 9000,
        "note": "Pays only through the on-chain oracle quorum. No assessor vote. Sale circuit-breaker closes Buys if the feeds go stale or the peg breaks.",
        "recordHref": "https://github.com/Kshot3000/PlutusShield/blob/main/contracts/cardano/deploy/deployments/preview.json",
        "addressUrl": "https://preview.cardanoscan.io/address/addr_test1wp89ggl7ls5gwxh02w7ja6zhytqe4a6zu6m6n82s0cxw9tq4j5tgr",
        "pageUrl": "https://kshot3000.github.io/PlutusShield/book/#usdm-depeg"
      },
      {
        "id": "exploit-v2",
        "live": true,
        "product": "exploit",
        "title": "Exploit-cover v2 · 2-of-3 committee",
        "subtitle": "Smart-contract exploit cover · Midnight evidence vault + Cardano Settle by 2 of 3 assessors",
        "network": "Cardano Preview + Midnight Preprod",
        "riskTier": "B",
        "riskMultBps": 10000,
        "baseRateBps": 450,
        "scorecard": {
          "product": "exploit",
          "label": "Smart-contract exploit cover",
          "whyTier": "One independent audit, twelve-to-twenty-four months live, multisig or timelocked upgrades, a public bounty, no known losses, and a multi-source oracle — eleven of fifteen points, the same middling band the live Preview exploit pools fix at InitPool.",
          "answers": {
            "audits": "one",
            "time-live": "12-24m",
            "upgradeability": "multisig-timelock",
            "bug-bounty": "public",
            "incidents": "none",
            "oracle": "multi"
          }
        },
        "breakdown": [
          {
            "id": "audits",
            "label": "Independent audits of the deployed contracts",
            "answer": "One audit",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An audit is the minimum evidence that someone outside the team read the code that holds the funds."
          },
          {
            "id": "time-live",
            "label": "Time live on mainnet with user funds",
            "answer": "12–24 months",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "Code that has held real value for longer has survived more attack attempts."
          },
          {
            "id": "upgradeability",
            "label": "Who can change the contracts",
            "answer": "Multisig or timelocked upgrades",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An upgrade key is a second way to lose funds: a stolen or misused key can replace the code."
          },
          {
            "id": "bug-bounty",
            "label": "Public bug bounty",
            "answer": "Public, funded bounty",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "A funded bounty gives whitehats a reason to report instead of exploit."
          },
          {
            "id": "incidents",
            "label": "Past exploits or losses",
            "answer": "No known losses",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An unresolved loss means the root cause may still be live."
          },
          {
            "id": "oracle",
            "label": "Price oracle dependence",
            "answer": "Multi-source or TWAP oracle",
            "points": 1,
            "why": "A protocol that trusts one price source can be drained by manipulating it."
          }
        ],
        "scored": {
          "points": 11,
          "maxPoints": 15,
          "share": 0.7333333333333333,
          "uncappedTier": "B"
        },
        "whyTier": "One independent audit, twelve-to-twenty-four months live, multisig or timelocked upgrades, a public bounty, no known losses, and a multi-source oracle — eleven of fifteen points, the same middling band the live Preview exploit pools fix at InitPool.",
        "address": "addr_test1wqyhhfq26zscxaa5kg2f7e9cedsqzsncf3epdkycmfuefuqumu402",
        "scriptHash": "097ba40ad0a18377b4b2149f64b8cb600142784c7216d898da7994f0",
        "initTx": "1580df549d5fe96ac5b9ed8df8d6d070176d1b3353007e88483d4d1d02fb18f0",
        "keyTxs": [
          {
            "label": "InitPool (exploit v2, 2-of-3 committee)",
            "hash": "1580df549d5fe96ac5b9ed8df8d6d070176d1b3353007e88483d4d1d02fb18f0",
            "at": "2026-10-06T23:50:01.680Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Deposit 300 ada (+300000000 lp0)",
            "hash": "101815113eb046ae6950575a74d9b040beb30cdadfbdd399f24458ad37786cb0",
            "at": "2026-10-06T23:51:12.096Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Buy 50 ada exploit cover",
            "hash": "4ed985795772f8c8df2f1867d5f1754c2d66af6e44ca3ea541aa0c942a9a77e4",
            "at": "2026-10-06T23:53:29.568Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Settle c6adbe887453 (2-of-3 committee-signed: assessor-1 + assessor-3, Midnight claim PAID)",
            "hash": "c35535dd089693d5b9676d5569a8d31b405726f7d02f782647d6afa67899ab38",
            "at": "2026-10-07T00:43:17.241Z"
          }
        ],
        "tranches": [
          {
            "index": 0,
            "symbol": "ADA",
            "ticker": "tADA",
            "decimals": 6,
            "capital": "443000000",
            "activeCover": "10000000",
            "freeCapacity": "388700000",
            "utilizationBps": 225,
            "totalShares": "498019801"
          },
          {
            "index": 1,
            "symbol": "USDC",
            "ticker": "tUSDCx",
            "decimals": 6,
            "capital": "1000000000",
            "activeCover": "0",
            "freeCapacity": "900000000",
            "utilizationBps": 0,
            "totalShares": "1000000000"
          }
        ],
        "policyCount": 1,
        "snapshotTakenAt": "2026-10-18T19:58:31.647Z",
        "maxUtilizationBps": 9000,
        "note": "Settle needs 2-of-3 assessor-committee signatures after the Midnight Preprod claim is resolved APPROVED. No single key can release capital.",
        "recordHref": "https://github.com/Kshot3000/PlutusShield/blob/main/contracts/cardano/deploy/deployments/preview-exploit-v2.json",
        "addressUrl": "https://preview.cardanoscan.io/address/addr_test1wqyhhfq26zscxaa5kg2f7e9cedsqzsncf3epdkycmfuefuqumu402",
        "pageUrl": "https://kshot3000.github.io/PlutusShield/book/#exploit-v2"
      },
      {
        "id": "exploit-v1",
        "live": false,
        "product": "exploit",
        "title": "Exploit-cover v1 · single assessor (legacy)",
        "subtitle": "First exploit pool on Preview · Settle needed the single assessor key · kept as history",
        "network": "Cardano Preview",
        "riskTier": "B",
        "riskMultBps": 10000,
        "baseRateBps": 450,
        "scorecard": {
          "product": "exploit",
          "label": "Smart-contract exploit cover",
          "whyTier": "One independent audit, twelve-to-twenty-four months live, multisig or timelocked upgrades, a public bounty, no known losses, and a multi-source oracle — eleven of fifteen points, the same middling band the live Preview exploit pools fix at InitPool.",
          "answers": {
            "audits": "one",
            "time-live": "12-24m",
            "upgradeability": "multisig-timelock",
            "bug-bounty": "public",
            "incidents": "none",
            "oracle": "multi"
          }
        },
        "breakdown": [
          {
            "id": "audits",
            "label": "Independent audits of the deployed contracts",
            "answer": "One audit",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An audit is the minimum evidence that someone outside the team read the code that holds the funds."
          },
          {
            "id": "time-live",
            "label": "Time live on mainnet with user funds",
            "answer": "12–24 months",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "Code that has held real value for longer has survived more attack attempts."
          },
          {
            "id": "upgradeability",
            "label": "Who can change the contracts",
            "answer": "Multisig or timelocked upgrades",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An upgrade key is a second way to lose funds: a stolen or misused key can replace the code."
          },
          {
            "id": "bug-bounty",
            "label": "Public bug bounty",
            "answer": "Public, funded bounty",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "A funded bounty gives whitehats a reason to report instead of exploit."
          },
          {
            "id": "incidents",
            "label": "Past exploits or losses",
            "answer": "No known losses",
            "points": 2,
            "why": "An unresolved loss means the root cause may still be live."
          },
          {
            "id": "oracle",
            "label": "Price oracle dependence",
            "answer": "Multi-source or TWAP oracle",
            "points": 1,
            "why": "A protocol that trusts one price source can be drained by manipulating it."
          }
        ],
        "scored": {
          "points": 11,
          "maxPoints": 15,
          "share": 0.7333333333333333,
          "uncappedTier": "B"
        },
        "whyTier": "One independent audit, twelve-to-twenty-four months live, multisig or timelocked upgrades, a public bounty, no known losses, and a multi-source oracle — eleven of fifteen points, the same middling band the live Preview exploit pools fix at InitPool.",
        "address": "addr_test1wrhj7yqp84ha6ldrgext6vds3ex0yrpqy79mfrykr7u4p8qpm3nnu",
        "scriptHash": "ef2f10013d6fdd7da3464cbd31b08e4cf20c20278bb48c961fb9509c",
        "initTx": "f016eb4fea98683342a224ddbee083d5a679e61abf1cbe5becf6e3d5bc0a77c2",
        "keyTxs": [
          {
            "label": "InitPool (exploit)",
            "hash": "f016eb4fea98683342a224ddbee083d5a679e61abf1cbe5becf6e3d5bc0a77c2",
            "at": "2026-10-06T22:16:18.412Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Deposit 600 ada (+600000000 lp0)",
            "hash": "15e9d556d3c41089fbad0510a917e8b795cdbb5f9617f99d534494f208f2c919",
            "at": "2026-10-06T22:16:45.136Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Buy 50 ada exploit cover",
            "hash": "30281045c62857fc6714436622f7633590fc114ff398f3b48f1dae515016946e",
            "at": "2026-10-06T22:19:11.678Z"
          },
          {
            "label": "Settle 4db477333323 (assessor-signed, Midnight claim PAID)",
            "hash": "5509c2d989c2e2d569d879d6f47d019ed78e0e2af4a385a3eb8a920c4f21cce8",
            "at": "2026-10-06T23:10:54.903Z"
          }
        ],
        "tranches": [],
        "policyCount": 1,
        "snapshotTakenAt": null,
        "maxUtilizationBps": 9000,
        "note": "Superseded by v2. LP capital remains withdrawable via the frozen script; new cover is sold from the v2 committee pool.",
        "recordHref": "https://github.com/Kshot3000/PlutusShield/blob/main/contracts/cardano/deploy/deployments/preview-exploit.json",
        "addressUrl": "https://preview.cardanoscan.io/address/addr_test1wrhj7yqp84ha6ldrgext6vds3ex0yrpqy79mfrykr7u4p8qpm3nnu",
        "pageUrl": "https://kshot3000.github.io/PlutusShield/book/#exploit-v1"
      }
    ]
  }
}
